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We describe a high-assurance framework for actively networked clients and servers. Called
Roundhouse consists of the following elements:
1. Pinkerton, a comprehensive model for the implementation of distributed protection domains
that provide for robust protection in an active networks environment;
2. Iron Horse: Functional and security design of a kernelized host providing essential ring-
based protection, packet authentication, and cryptography services for higher layers.
3. DEPOT: Specification, design, and prototype implementation on a PC base of the framework
and initial content of dynamically modifiable servers. The intent is that DEPOT clients and
servers would take advantage of platform protected modes where available (e.g., Windows
NT, Iron Horse) leading to client-server computing in a network of heterogeneously trusted
hosts.
4. As a general facility for installing and managing application hooks" DEPOT incorporates
the following key new ideas:
"* the division of sets of hooks by module,
"* the partial ordering of modules,
"* binding hooks to network names, and
"* the provision of a run-time model of module behavior with a visible state machine
model that abstracts and externalizes the dynamic behavior of that module.
The architecture is unique in that it composes strong and weak systems securely and permits the
dynamic retooling of executing software.
Executive Summary
We are targeting C4I and OLTP networked systems because they are immensely valuable.
We focus on these because they offer the greatest opportunity for cost reduction:
"• Maintenance and retooling costs are extremely high and outweigh development costs.
"* They are vulnerable, relatively unprotected national assets.
Our long-range goal is to permit an order of magnitude reduction in protection and retooling
costs. (Protection cost is expected loss due to penetration.)
Our solution, Roundhouse, involves the following architectures:
"* Pinkerton, a comprehensive model for distributed protection domains.
"* DEPOT, a distributed operating system extension for C4 I/OLTP applications.
"* Iron Horse, a high assurance kernel supporting DEPOT for use where "ground zero" points
of vulnerability must be protected (e.g., master key repository)
Roundhouse employs a highly innovative blend of existing and new technologies to achieve
its overall goals. Each of the following plays a critical role.
"* Dynamic linking techniques (1960s)
"* Multi-state hardware based protection (1960s, re-emerging)
"* Transaction processing (1970s)
"* Split address space technology (1970s)
"* Event-oriented programming (unique to this architecture)
"* Scalable distributed authentication (1990s)
* Active networks (1990s)
* Answers the question: where do you put the crypto keys? (unique to this architecture)
The Pinkerton architecture incorporates
* A sound, conservative access control model for protection of distributed resources
* Prevents critical resources from migrating to weakly protected domains or hosts
"* Prevents critical resources from being contaminated or modified from weakly protected
domains or hosts
"* Permits strongly protected servers to service weakly protected clients
"* Completes authentication architectures by specifying protection grades for functions
The DEPOT architecture supports
"* Both queued and RPC-oriented transaction processing
"* Continuous system operation
"* Supports dynamically customizable system environment per server
"• Provides strong support for encapsulation of legacy applications
The Iron Horse architecture includes
"* Minimized security kernel optimized for transaction processing
"• Includes essential TP support functions (e.g., logging, secure multi-threading)
"• Offers optional support for military secrecy policies
"* High degree of concurrency inside the kernel
In summary, this architecture is unique in providing
"* An architecture that composes strong and weak systems securely
"• Dynamic retooling of executing software
2
1 Introduction to the Problem
The following scenario is an example of the real world problem domain that can be
supported with secure active networking:
The Universal Command and Control System (UCCS) is a highly distributed system
involving numerous platforms and commands, supporting military operations worldwide. The
Highly Reliable Software Production Facility (HRSPF), recently assigned responsibility for
improving system performance, has generated update 3.01, an update to routing algorithms
intended to be installed in thousands of routers throughout the system, including routers serving
highly critical processing nodes. The update introduces a critically needed performance'
improvement, so that time is of the essence. Accordingly, it is determined that the systems'
active network capability will be used to distribute and install the update. This capability permits
information packets to be flooded throughout the network without requiring the creation of
individual sessions between HRSPF and each router. Whenever a packet traverses a router the
update is extracted, validated, and loaded. In some relatively short time, most routers will have
been updated.
Our approach addresses the following needs:
1. It is highly undesirable to be required to remove a router from service before installing an
update. The DEPOT component will define an architecture for flexible servers that can be
safely and dynamically retooled, without risking loss of a packet or message, entering an
inconsistent state, or having to disable the server in order to recompile or re-link program
code. We reach this goal by creating a useful blend of transaction processing (TP), dynamic
linking, and object-oriented technologies.
2. It is unrealistic to suppose that attempts to introduce spurious active packets into the network
will not occur. In order to permit the use of such technology in support of mission-critical
processing, a sound, highly reliable approach for differentiating valid from spurious packets
must be available. Although cryptography and access controls provide the needed
technologies, these must be incorporated into a workable protection architecture that can be
independently reviewed and is demonstrably sound. Moreover, the architecture must
accommodate the employment and inter-operation of host platforms having a wide range of
trust characteristics. Our architecture addresses this need by providing a detailed model
addressing protection in a distributed system composed of heterogeneously trusted host
platforms.
3. Cryptographic solutions addressing the trusted distribution of software rely on the existence
of some repository where highly sensitive keys may be stored. Ultimately, the security of any
cryptographically protected system is only as good as that afforded to its most sensitive keys.
Our architecture therefore includes architectural work for a high assurance host, Iron Horse.
Roundhouse refers to the combination of DEPOT running on the Iron Horse kernel.
The problem domain addressed by Roundhouse is not confined to military command and
control (C41) systems. Roundhouse and DEPOT hosted on conventional platforms is intended to
support- On-Line Transaction Processing (OLTP) applications of all varieties. This style of
application design is widely used today in many commercial sectors such as energy, banking,
finance, transportation, and telecommunications to perform critical business functions. Of
course, the protection and reliability of these sectors is of national concern [2].
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1.1 Military and Civilian applications for DEPOT
Similar requirements have driven civilian OLTP and C4, military systems towards
remarkably similar architectural styles, which we call the Transaction Processing (TP) paradigm.
Its characteristics are as follows:
" A unit of work is not accomplished by one process from start to finish. Rather, it moves
through the system from one specialized process to another. Each process is furnished with
just the resources it needs when initialized to save OS calls for requesting resources.
" Two control strategies are frequent for TP applications. One strategy is to manage a work
item using Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) or similar facilities: i.e., a "master" server process
divides tasks into subtasks, farms them out to subordinate servers, then collects and collates
the results. The difficulty with this strategy is that it often unnecessarily centralizes control
and leads to unnecessary network traffic. Accordingly, a second control strategy, modeled as
a set of workstations coupled by queues, through which work flows as through an assembly
line, is also common. This strategy has the benefit of decentralizing control and rendering
the application more robust, but can make it hard to track work.
"* Multi-threading - the multiplexing of multiple independent execution points (each with its
own stack) onto a single address space - is very common. The usual reason given for
multithreading is that it permits one to substitute lightweight context switches for
heavyweight switches and thereby increases throughput. (This is true, however, only if
multithreading is used intelligently.) It is universally understood that multi-threading poses a
significant problem for operating-system level security, where address space isolation is the
basic technique for enforcing run-time access controls.
"* Generally, typical performance goals might be stated as:
1. To achieve stated end-to-end average latency.
2. To preserve this latency under high load conditions (e.g., up to 80% or so of
theoretically maximum capacity).
The optimization techniques used for TP, some of which are described above, work well
when the work to be done is fairly stereotyped, because it then becomes possible to tailor
processes into "specialists" and route work to the processes specialized to do it. Unfortunately,
because the TP paradigm and time-sharing paradigms are not very similar, the relationship
between TP applications and time-sharing OS are often fairly uneasy. It is not uncommon to find
the application overriding, disabling, or working around operating system resource allocation,
scheduling, and security policies and re-implementing them as part of the application.
Several general forces then converge to render many TP application systems very inflexible
and costly to change or maintain:
"* They are intrinsically large programs: too costly to replace very often.
"* The application logic tends to be heavily interlaced with calls to functions associated with
resource management, security, scheduling, and so on. Maintenance is error-prone, costly,
and time-consuming because a change potentially impacts these system functions in
mysterious ways.
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* Because the application is mission- or business-critical, it is costly (or deadly) to shut the
application down for maintenance.
As well as incurring significant costs for industries already using TP, this general lack of
flexibility has frustrated the use of TP techniques by industries that have less stereotyped work
flows: e.g., hospitals, pharmaceuticals, information providers, professional services and the like.
Considering these factors, we have identified the following as important long-range research
goals for Roundhouse:
" To achieve a radical improvement in the maintainability of new TP applications by divorcing
computational functions as completely as possible from logic integrating the function into a
larger system.
"* To embrace (not merely tolerate) the requirement to effectively encapsulate legacy servers
and applications.
"* To provide a malleable TP-oriented framework that permits dynamic reconfiguration of work
paths, and retooling of individual system environments for servers on a per server basis
"* To investigate hardware support for secure multi-threading
"* To investigate what functions must be kernelized to support TP
These goals have strongly influenced our technical approach.
2 Roundhouse Sketch
Roundhouse involves the use of active networking techniques to support Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (C4I) and On-Line Transaction Processing (OLTP) application
systems. We have targeted this class of systems because it includes most so-called critical
infrastructure systems. The security architecture includes the following elements:
"* Pinkerton, a comprehensive model for the implementation of distributed protection domains
that provide for robust protection in an active networks environment;
"* An extensible, object-oriented interface architecture for a class (Depot) of objects
encapsulating individual C 4I/OLTP server processes.
"* An architecture and prototype design for a high-assurance run-time kernel (Iron Horse)
hosted on an ISA or extended ISA-compliant hardware base tailored to support C 4I/OLTP
processing. Iron Horse is used in the Pinkerton architecture to support security-critical
management and storage functions (e.g., key management, and storage of root keys, and
storage of critical certificates).
The following sections outline our technical approach to developing a high assurance active
networking architecture.
2.1 Nomenclature
The primary facility seen by designers and programmers is called DEPOT. DEPOT is an
acronym standing for "Distributed Extensible Processing Objects for Transactions" and refers to
both the software implementing the DEPOT object class, and objects of the class itself Roughly
speaking, a DEPOT object is an encapsulated server with a server-specific, extensible execution
environment. Programmers are able to define dynamic installed service sets (DISSs) for the
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Depots. The remaining architectural names (Iron Horse, Roundhouse) are not acronyms, but
simple code names.
Since one of the primary goals is usability on a variety of platforms, DEPOT is portable. The
degree to which DEPOT objects and their contents are protected will naturally vary from
platform to platform, depending upon the underlying protection mechanisms made available by
the host. Iron Horse is a specialized platform intended to provide DEPOT with strongly enforced,
hardware-assisted local protection capabilities. Roundhouse is the code name for our project,
encompassing the entire set of architectures to be produced for both DEPOT and Iron Horse.
2.2 Roundhouse Security Overview.
Roundhouse security is decomposed into two parts that are handled quite differently.
"* Protection refers to the enforcement of access controls to protect Roundhouse components
(i.e., host system and Roundhouse code and data) using the strongest protection mechanisms
provided by the host hardware and operating system. A key feature of our protection model
(Pinkerton) is that it explicitly accommodates hosts with heterogeneous protection and
authentication mechanisms (including those providing no hardware-supported protection at
all). Our strategy thus differs in kind from many other efforts. Rather than trying to design a
software-only protection solution [3] that will provide the same protection quality wherever it
runs, we provide a means for administrators to grade the systems they have, allocate critical
services and data to hosts of appropriate grade, and then operate the heterogeneous network
safely. The protection model provides optional support as well for the enforcement of
military-style mandatory access control policies [1].
" Application-level security refers to the enforcement of controls, including, but not limited
to, traditional discretionary access controls (DAC) protecting user-level data maintained or
processed by Roundhouse applications. By definition, such access controls are type-specific
[5]. In order to provide a general and extensible environment for application-level security,
we do not wish to constrain application security policy or its administration. Therefore
Roundhouse provides a flexible framework that permits suitably authorized administrators to
install or replace such controls. As a special case, DAC and audit for Roundhouse objects
themselves are provided as administrator-replaceable software units using exactly the same
mechanisms available for any Roundhouse application administrator. A key notion driving
the application security framework design is that the modules making the access control or
audit decision are dynamically linked to the application proper, which is responsible only for
identifying when an access check is required. The currently linked access control module
evaluates the request and passes to the application an action indicator telling the application
whether to grant or deny the access. Audit log events are transparently generated if required
at the same time. Thus, a properly designed Roundhouse application can achieve a rather
high degree of policy transparency.
The architecture will support "generic" ACL-based controls for objects encapsulated by
the DEPOT core (queues, modules, and so on). Appropriately authenticated active packets
may be used to modify, remove, or replace the default controls with application-specific
controls on these objects.
A problem with identity-based controls is that each layer of application software creating
new applications must re-implement them for new abstractions. The DEPOT architecture
6
facilitates this by permitting application-level agents to expose transitions representing the
need for an access check. This affords the application designer the opportunity to perform the
check in a specialized add-on" agent subscribing to the access check transition. The
advantage of using this capability is that the access policy is not "hard-wired" into the
application logic and so can be easily replaced or modified. Naturally, user-level requests do
not receive enough privilege to modify the ring-protected identity-based security agents.
The event-based architecture can be used in much the same way to accommodate audit:
one can dynamically install an audit agent that captures and stores information from the
current event and request context transparently to the application agent inducing the event.
3 Pinkerton Protection Model
Pinkerton is a high-level protection model that specifies locally enforceable rules for building
a protection-safe network from individual Roundhouse hosts. A key feature of the Pinkerton
model is that it permits the use of heterogeneous hosts (i.e., using different internal protection
mechanisms, including none). What is meant by "protection safe" is that a more highly protected
server, running on a node such as Iron Horse, can safely provide services to all of its clients,
even those running on a host with weaker protection. In order for a less-trusted client to subvert a
server, the server's internal protection mechanisms would have to be overcome: it cannot be done
simply by sending the server a spurious "active packet", management request, or service request
containing a Trojan Horse. Roundhouse core services uses cryptographic authentication
mechanisms to label incoming packets and requests and carefully segregates system-level and
user-level packets and requests: the locally available protection mechanism is used thereafter to
separate them. Ultimately, protection is based upon key distribution: a "weak" node never is
given a key that would allow its traffic to be labeled elsewhere as from a stronger node, and it
cannot gain such a key without subverting a node of the stronger protection class.
3.1 Protection Policy Design
Pinkerton actually models an enumerably infinite class of potential protection policies. The
system security officer selects one of these policies by defining a set of abstract protection
classes, defining a partial ordering over these classes representing their intended trust
relationship, and allocating nodes and internal protection domains to each class. (Relatively
obvious constraints are imposed by the model on the allocation based upon intrinsic privilege
relationships, software dependencies, and so on: one cannot make an allocation that permits a
more trusted domain to depend upon a less trusted one.)
Additionally, for each class, one defines an authentication and encryption profile that
Roundhouse will require for management-level operations on entities (including Depots) of that
class. Roundhouse distinguishes between client requests/replies to a Depot (which are simply
presented to the Depot on its queues) and Depot management requests (which are interpreted and
executed by the Roundhouse core).
Pinkerton addresses the issue of cooperation under conditions of mutual suspicion [4,6].
Administrators may set up new, shared classes, or agree to treat designated classes (one from
each administrative domain) as equal, or both. The modified policy settings will then permit the
desired degree of sharing.
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Pinkerton permits servers to service clients not previously known by assigning such requests
to an administratively defined protection class (typically "protection-low").
3.2 Intended use
It is possible to define a fairly elaborate, application-specific system with a large number of
distinct protection classes using the Pinkerton model. Experience with systems incorporating
similar integrity controls has proven that this is usually a mistake. For the administration of a
small enterprise one might think in terms of only a few groups of users (e.g., insiders and
outsiders) and define a correspondingly small set of protection classes. A good motto is "less is
more, but none is too little".
3.3 Protection Policy
In general, it is expected that most aspects of security, both in the narrow sense of traditional
access controls and the broader senses being discussed by the active networks community will be
implemented as application-specific dynamically installed service sets (DIS Ss). However, the
issue of self-protection is such an important one that controls addressing this need are built into
Core Services.
An important consideration is that the quality of protection available for DISSs and
applications varies from platform to platform, depending upon the underlying host. On the one
hand, we want to exploit and leverage strong isolation and protection capabilities where they
exist (e.g., on Iron Horse, Windows/NT, VMS, etc.). On the other hand, we do not want to
unnecessarily prohibit communications between stronger and weaker machines. We therefore
need a coherent, demonstrably correct model that prescribes which requests are to be honored,
and which are to be ignored in order to maintain the integrity of strongly protected DISSs. This
model must meet some common-sense objectives:
" Support management requests. We would like to be able to dynimically modify, replace or
install DISSs, using active network techniques, if, and only if, the packet or request implying
such an action emanates from a sufficiently trustworthy source.
" Support service requests. If a request packet does not imply modification of the DEPOT
configuration, but simply requests services, the range of sources we are willing to service is
presumably broader. Meeting the first objective by requiring all packets to meet the criteria
enforced for "management" packets is therefore inappropriate.
The key problem that must be addressed for any framework hosted on many different
platforms is that of understanding how strongly protected instances (e.g., hosted on Iron Horse)
may successfully provide services to poorly protected instances (e.g., hosted on a PC running
MSDOS) without excessive risk to its own integrity. Three major issues (and a host of minor
ones) must be addressed:
"* At the local level, how do we prevent the less trusted client from stealing any privileges the
more trusted server might possess?
"* At the level of an administrative domain (i.e., a set of nodes managed by a single enterprise)
how do we know that the composition of individual solutions is coherent and meaningful?
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At the level of communications among different administrative domains, possibly with quite
different notions of what it means to be trustworthy or approaches for protecting data, how
may one arrange for the safe sharing of information and services without exposing either
domain to uncontrollable risks? (This is the problem of mutual suspicion.)
As the model tackles a difficult problem in some detail it is necessarily somewhat complex.
The remainder of this section describes some of its salient features. Space precludes sketching
the implementation approach in great detail.
The key insight is that what must be accomplished in the distributed environment is exactly
what is accomplished locally by a ring mechanism. Rings provide a means whereby service
requests by less trusted subjects (i.e., service calls) can be safely honored (after the appropriate
set of argument validations is performed) without compromising the integrity of a properly
implemented trusted subject (the same process executing in a more privileged ring). The primary
difference is that in the distributed environment, it is impossible for a local protection domain in
one node to be privileged (in the sense of having direct access) with respect to objects in another
node: everything must be passed as argument or result. But this difference is a difference in the
safe direction. Ultimately, our argument that the model is correct is based upon the belief that
rings, properly utilized, work, as our model is in the large a "distributed version of rings". Most
of the actual complexity derives from the need to show how authentication and cryptography fits
into the picture and specification of an adequate set of constraints to deal with differences in
mechanism strength.
3.4 Pinkerton Details
The following section (adapted from the proposal) describes the Pinkerton model in greater
detail.
3.4.1 Local Protection Domains (LPDs)
Local Protection Domains are the basic building blocks from which the desired network-
level abstractions are built. Intuitively, an LPD is an execution domain or its like. Unlike more
traditional models, we accept LPDs that are protected by mechanisms of various strengths.
Policy constraints are eventually defined that permit administrators (not applications, users, or
programmers) to take these differences into account. For example, on one node we might have
LPDs protected by address space separation with hardware assistance (e.g., Iron Horse); on a
second, local protection domains built with server-owned ACLs (e.g., VMS or Windows NT); on
a third, virtual domains managed by a closed language interpreter (e.g., a Java machine); and on
a fourth, a single monolithic LPD (e.g., an ordinary PC).
Within each node, a partial trust ordering is given for its LPDs based upon privilege and
dependency relationships, in the natural way (i.e., if A is privileged with respect to B, and/or B
depends upon A, A must be as or more trusted than B).
3.4.2 Security Administration Domain (SADs)
A security administration domain is a dynamic set of nodes (and by inclusion, their LPDs)
that shares and enforces an identical, administratively defined protection policy. Services may be
extended to nodes outside the SAD. No implication is intended that the SAD have any purpose
other than to establish the range of nodes enforcing the same administratively defined policy.
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3.4.3 Extended Protection Domain (EPDs)
EPDs are network-visible objects representing groups of LPDs defined by the SAD
administrator to be equivalent, for the purposes of protection - that is, equally trustworthy. The
set of EPDs is partially ordered, with an ordering consistent (in the natural sense) with the partial
orderings of the LPDs within nodes. We denote by the expression E(A) the unique EPD
containing LPD A. Basically, two rules must be enforced.
* LPD A may use services provided by LPD B only if E(B) is as, or more trusted than E(A).
Obviously, if this rule is violated, the trustworthiness of LPD B will be compromised
because it now depends upon a less trustworthy component.
* LPD A may accept management commands (including, but not restricted to, commands to
install or modify the existing DISS configuration) from LPD B only if E(B) is as, or more,
trusted than E(A).
In addition to assigning LPDs to EPDs, the administrator defines for each EPD a set of
indicators flagging the cryptographic and authentication, and other protection checks that must
be associated with communications involving managing or servicing the LPD (e.g., for adding
an DISS that executes in the LPD).
Thus, enforcement of the rules broadly expressed above involves several ideas:
e Each and every flagged criterion must be passed before a packet will be accepted as a valid
service response or management directive.
9 Included among these are source authentication, determining that the desired cryptographic
protocol was applied, and whatever other criteria might be built into the model (exactly how
many criteria will be applied is a research issue).
We believe that this approach is consistent and sound, because it can be mapped to abstract
models of ring-like protection systems. In our interpretation of the model for distributed
protection, these operations (in part) turn into the operations of "selecting and using indicated
authentication and encryption protocols".
3.5 A Note on Application Security
Security for Roundhouse supported-applications is decomposed into two parts, the first of
which has been described as "Protection". We have performed this decomposition because we
are convinced that protection concerns are of sufficient importance, and of sufficient complexity
in the network environment, to demand a single point of administration where a knowledgeable
administrator can make decisions regarding the protection structure of the SAD that cannot be
overridden by local node administrators, programmers, or users. The protection model described
can, if used thoughtlessly, quickly lead to undesirable complexity: practical SAD administrators
will typically define only a few EPDs.
The remaining security concerns (and there are many) we treat as "application-specific"
security. The default security DISS will provide ACL-based discretionary security for DEPOT
objects proper. These controls, as for any DISS, are dynamically replaceable (provided one is
authorized under the current ACL to make the replacement and the replacement software passes
the protection checks it must to satisfy the protection policy.
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One can imagine creating specialized DISS modules permitting cooperating instances to
enforce many of the more exotic policies being discussed within the active network community.
The notion of enforcing context-sensitive policies based upon flows (considered as threads of
execution in their own right) is also very intriguing: we believe that this research direction leads
to enforcement of typical business rules.
4 Iron Horse
Iron Horse is a high-assurance platform intended to support critical security functions in our
active network architecture. It will provide significant protection for instances of DEPOT, the
framework for dynamically modifiable servers. Iron Horse provides a basis for establishing
protection domains and is, itself, self-protecting. As a DEPOT host, it is intended to support the
entire spectrum of DEPOT processing. From the point of view of protection, the Iron Horse
system can be decomposed into the following subsystems, beginning with the most privileged
and proceeding to the least.
4.1 Non-discretionary Integrity Domains
IRON HORSE is intended to enforce locally a coarse-grained non-discretionary integrity
policy, primarily to afford strong assurances that hosted DEPOT servers cannot be corrupted by
spurious active packets or server management commands. Users may wish to take advantage of
the capability to partition user-level data into non-discretionary protected subsystems.
It is useful to state a litmus test for evaluating the overall success of a security architecture:
It must be possible to protect, with a strong degree of confidence, critical
enterprise data and the servers manipulating that data while continuing to offer
less-protected service to clients executing on less trusted, or untrusted platforms.
We believe that a system approach failing to meet the first criterion cannot be called secure
in any justifiable sense, while a system approach failing to meet the second criterion cannot be
called operationally useful in any justifiable sense.
In order to meet the litmus test, it is essential that DEPOT-encapsulated servers be able to
receive and process queries emanating from less trusted clients. This implies that the servers
must be trusted with respect to a pure Biba [7] integrity policy.
The Iron Horse solution is based upon the observation that the transfer of a service request to
a DEPOT server is analogous, in every respect, to the transfer of gate call arguments from a less
to a more privileged ring. How to build a gatekeeper that effectively sanitizes arguments is well
understood. In the architecture contemplated, IRON HORSE and DEPOT agents executing in
highly privileged (and thus, highly protected) rings will coordinate to perform this function,
resulting in a high degree of confidence that spurious privileged active packets are processed in
the correct ring and that untrustworthy user-level requests are executed in an outer ring not
privileged to modify critical data nor initiate management or reconfiguration actions. The partial
ordering of DEPOT modules is key to making this architecture work, as it allows us to allocate




A primary goal of the Iron Horse effort is to investigate the exploitation of multiple
hardware-supported address spaces or split address space technology to reduce the cost of inter-
domain switching. The Intel iAPX 86 CPU architecture already supports a simple form of MAT
with two per process address spaces (i.e., the LDT, or local descriptor table, and GDT, or global
descriptor table), although few commercially-available general purpose Operating Systems have
chosen to exploit this capability in the way we envision. Accordingly, the initial hardware target
for Iron Horse will be ISA-bus compatible systems (e.g., ordinary IBM-compatible PCs) as this
hardware configuration is widely available, relatively inexpensive, and supported by numerous
development environments. Although we are targeting IBM-compatible hardware, there is no
current intent to design a DOS- or Windows-compatible API into Iron Horse.
Ultimately, CPUs supporting a larger number of independent address spaces may become
available. Such CPUs would become an attractive target for further experimentation.
4.3 Iron Horse Kernel
Residing in the most privileged protection level (Privilege Level 0) is the Iron Horse Kernel.
This might concisely be described as a relatively traditional kernel that virtualizes access to basic
system resources and provides a virtual environment for higher-level processes. The kernel will
not be "monolithic" in the normally understood sense (i.e., a single monolithic "critical section").
Instead, it will support a high degree of concurrency. The principal researchers have considerable
practical experience in designing and implementing non-monolithic kernels.
The security policy enforced by the kernel will be a highly-configurable label-based policy
supporting the definition and protection of a set of partially ordered protection domains, with
domain isolation based upon management of per process LDT and GDT images and the
hardware-based ring mechanism local execution domains.
The primary innovations to be incorporated in the Iron Horse Kernel design are these:
o Exploitation of LDT management functions. This permits the implementation of secure
multithreading in the DEPOT layer.
o Support for essential transaction-oriented functions. In particular, the kernel will export a
logging function and a set of functions allowing it to respond (as a local resource manager)
to transactional commands issued by a DEPOT level transaction manager (e.g., begin
transaction, end transaction, commit, abort, checkpoint, savepoint).
o Support for lightweight context switches in architecture exploiting split address space
technology. Transitions between high assurance domains have traditionally required full
context switches, resulting in lowered system performance. Threads have been developed to
avoid context switching. Because threads share address spaces, hardware mediation cannot
be used to place threads into different protection domains. We intent to work on reducing the
cost of context switches by exploiting the multiple descriptor tables offered by the iA86
CPU. This permits the implementation of secure multithreading in the DEPOT layer.
o Optimized to support the efficient scheduling and execution of DEPOT objects. Put another
way, the kernel will be designed for TP-style processing rather than, for example, time-
sharing.
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Figure 1. Iron Horse and DEPOT integrity domains.
Although "low-level" synchronization primitives solving the secure reader-writers problem
will be exported (e.g., eventcounts, sequencers) it is expected that synchronization of most
applications will be via the DEPOT level transaction manager. The primary use of low-level
primitives would be to support the development of application-level resource managers.
The second point deserves further elaboration, as the full import of the requirement may not
be immediately obvious. Modern distributed transaction processing architectures are based upon
the cooperation of a higher-level transaction manager (which will be part of DEPOT) and lower
level resource managers providing access to durable and recoverable data. Both depend upon a
basic logging capability. Making the kernel a resource manager means that when a failure
occurs, it will recover (in coordination with other participating nodes) into a state that is not only
secure, but consistent with all distributed transactions that are recovered. Figure 1 illustrates
Depots on a base supporting integrity domains for applications.
5 DEPOT
As one means of providing isolation of DISSs, it is desirable to permit DEPOTs to execute in
distinct LPDs if made available by the host machine. (How DISSs are allocated to these domains
.remains the province of the DEPOT administrator.) A DEPOT with its DISSs can span multiple
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LPDs. However, intrinsic functional dependencies will constrain how this can be done. An
important research goal will be to investigate such constraints.
5.1 The DEPOT Processing Paradigm
DEPOT is an alternative model to that of simply loading a statically linked, opaque code
segments into the address space of a run-time process.
The DEPOT model replaces the notion of a process with that of a durable, recoverable active
processing object called a Depot. It is intended that Depot objects be well-suited for
implementations of remotely accessible servers. The internal process structure of a Depot is
hidden from its clients, who communicate with it using queue-based messages.
A typical Depot makes the following major sub-objects visible to clients (although only
clients involved in managing or reconfiguring the Depot will be interested in many of them):
* one or more message queues that handle all communications with the Depot. Schemas for
each queue are also visible.
.* a collection of agents (code objects) that collectively implement the behavior of the Depot.
Agents are grouped into a partially ordered set of named modules.
For each module, an externally visible state machine model (SMM) that abstracts and
externalizes the dynamic behavior of that module. In a sense, SSMs are to behavior as
schemas are to data. The transitions of the SSM are called events. Events are typically
associated with internal calls for service (e.g., system calls such as alloc, enqueue, dequeue,
etc.) Some events are induced by the Depot system (e.g., execute initial agent).
The most unusual characteristics of the above model are the following:
* Agents may be dynamically added, removed, or replaced by placing appropriately formatted
management messages (i.e., active packets) on the input queue.
* Similarly, the SMM may be dynamically extended in various ways (just as new fields may be
added to a data schema), subject to straightforward consistency constraints.
Agents do not directly invoke one another. Rather, agents may subscribe to an existing event.
An executing agent typically induces an event defined for its module by making a system
call. It is possible for an agent to explicitly invoke a lower level agent by name: however,
that is turned into an event by Depot so that subscribing agents may seize the thread of
control. To the inducing agent, the call looks like an ordinary subroutine call and return: in
fact, any number of subordinate agents may have executed between the call and return.
One might characterize the system as a general facility for installing and managing
application "hooks": the key new ideas are the division of sets of hooks by module, the partial
ordering of modules, binding hooks to network names, and the provision of a run-time model of
module behavior with the SSM. It is just these new features, however, that give us a means for
securing the Depot.
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Figure 2 illustrates the flow of control within a Depot:
(a) Agent 1 makes a system call to allocate memory;
(b) as a result Agent 1 induces a state transition;
(c) the transition takes place in the SSM;
(d) Agents A and B are invoked as subscribers to the SSM of the Module containing Agent
1;
(e) additional state transitions and invocations may take place in a chain of modules-




Data passed via queues
Queues have Schemas
Figure 2. Depot Flow of Control
(f) ultimately the system call to allocate memory is executed; and
(g) as in a threaded language, return is made to Agent 1.
The DEPOT software is divided into three parts: the integration library (consisting of that
code that must be rewritten to re-host DEPOT), DEPOT Core services, and a library of standard
extensions defining default DEPOT object behavior. The standard library will be discussed in the
next section. This section describes the processing model to be implemented by Core services.
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A DEPOT is an extensible processing object with the following properties:
"* It is persistent. That is, it contains durable, recoverable state that gives it an identity that
spans network sessions and host downtimes. It has a network-visible name.
"* It is stationary. That is, it resides on a particular host.
"• It is queue-driven. Each depot is associated with its own standard input queue, from which it
draws requests, and deposits its responses on its own standard output queue.
Conceptually, a DEPOT may be thought of as a specialized server: its application-level code
is basically a loop within which a request is dequeued, processed, and enqueued. "Add-on"
behavior is via dynamically added extensions. The goal is to completely decouple the
application logic from the environment: it refers only to programmer- or system-defined names
(e.g., stdin, stdout, stderr).
One may contrast a DEPOT with a more conventional object-oriented framework, which
consists of a set of defined object classes that can be specialized to work in a given target
environment.
"Specialization" means, ultimately, generating a brand-new object with some behaviors
different from the old. This may work well for new applications, but it is not a useful paradigm
for the integration of legacy servers written in languages that know nothing of inheritance.
Rather, non-application specific behaviors are added to DEPOT servers in the form of
dynamically linked, physically replaceable extensions. Because legacies can't possibly invoke
new extensions by name, invocation of the extension must be based upon occurrence of some
event that the operating system can detect: e.g., a system call, program interrupt, or detection of a
fault as the program is running. We therefore provision the DEPOT with a run-time model of
application behavior, in the form of a non-deterministic state machine that represents the possible
sequences of detectable events available for potential interception by extensions. These
transitions are named. When a new extension is installed, the installing authority specifies by
name the set of events that are to trigger the extension. For new applications, of course, events
can be defined and triggered explicitly if desired (a facility analogous to the notion of a
"software interrupt". This description provides an overview (with much detail suppressed) of
what we call "event-based programming" (EBP). For new applications, it is merely cute: but it is
a key feature for supporting the encapsulation of legacy servers.
For new applications, we encourage the programmer to think in terms of the following
structure: writing the "application proper" as a bare-bone "request processor" that contains
nothing but highly-re-usable computational logic. All integration with the large-scale
environment is handled by drawing from whatever libraries of extensions already exist. Since
these are themselves written in terms of object classes, specialization of library extension objects
will presumably be an important means of generating new extensions.
As the number of extensions associated with a given DEPOT is likely to be large, prevention
of interference and extension management becomes an issue. A modularization facility is
provided in the DEPOT model to help manage extensions.
Programmers define dynamically installed service sets (DISSs). These may be modified at
runtime, by the dynamic addition of extensions. The extensions within a DISS may be grouped
into partially ordered sets. The partial ordering is intended to provide a means for programmers
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to identify subsets of DISSs that could be allocated to different protection rings on platforms
(such as Iron Horse) where application-level rings are available. A DISS corresponds in much
respect to what programmers using multiple-inheritance object-oriented languages call mix-in
classes (the notion is that a basic object class can be enhanced by inheriting from an enumerated
set of mix-in classes). Here, however, the mix-in classes are added dynamically as needed, rather
than being statically specified as part of the design of a given DEPOT. It is intended that on
platforms supporting multiple local protection domains, DISSs will be executed in different
domains to provide address-space isolation. Multiple DISSs may, however, be bound together
into a new DISS where the designer wishes to avoid unwanted context switches.
5.2 Standard Extension Library
A framework without content is not very useful. While providing the application code is the
programmer's responsibility, DEPOT will provide a library of standard extension modules that
collectively provide a minimal, but useful distributed TP processing environment.
The following list (not necessarily complete) identifies some of the standard modules:
" Queue Flow Manager. As described so far, work "magically" appears on input queues and
disappears. The Queue Flow Manager is the DISS that performs this magic. Each request is
framed with routing control information (e.g., where to return the response). The QFM is
triggered by system calls for input and output and uses frame information to forward output
and error responses, to induce scheduling events when the input queue is empty, to store
responses that can't be immediately forwarded, and to apply a scheduling policy periodically.
" DEPOT object and management (enable, disable, lock, unlock, shutdown, etc.). The
semantics of object management will conform to ISO/IEC 10164-2.
" DEPOT object security. This will enforce traditional discretionary access controls
constraining who may successfully modify the depot, examine its state, modify its set of
extensions, issue management commands, etc. The overall protection policy is also enforced.
" Default instrumentation, allowing DEPOT and queue contents to be examined and modified
for debugging.
" Transaction processing, permitting a request to be processed as part of a local or distributed
transaction. This facility includes deadlock detection and recovery and failure recovery
capabilities. The transaction management architecture will conform to an existing standard.
The position of the library DISSs in the module hierarchy relative to the application code
(which is in most respects simply another DISS) has not yet be determined. The notion is that
when a new DEPOT is created, it will be furnished with a default behavior (e.g., as an
instrumented initial configuration) which can then be shaped into the desired server by
dynamically replacing the default application DISS and library DISSs as needed.
Each module, when installed, potentially extends the externally visible API of the DEPOT.
That is, not only does it respond to internally induced events but can (if so designed) be sent
messages and emit responses on its own input and output queues. It has its own state-machine
event description (that, in effect, extends the state machine description of the application by
substituting for a transition a subordinate state machine). It is quite possible for a coherent set
instantiations installed on various depots to communicate with each other in order to perform
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collective management and control tasks - we intend to implement much, if not all, of the
transaction manager this way.
This leads to an alternative view of the system. So far, we have provided a "DEPOT-centric"
description, focusing on a single DEPOT and its local environment. However, if we examine a
"modular slice" of a set of cooperating DEPOTs (focusing, for example, on all of the "security
enforcement" modules) we can view the system as a layered set of cooperating agents, (DISSs)
attached to host DEPOTs, that together exhibit some desired collective behavior. This is likely to
be the view adopted by subsystem designers when working on a new class DISSs.
5.3 DEPOT on other platforms
We have described DEPOT as hosted upon a customized platform, Iron Horse. To meet the
needs of the OLTP community, it is important, however, that DEPOT be portable to a wide
variety of platforms. The DEPOT integration library component maps DEPOT infrastructure
abstractions to the host operating system and, if necessary, implements missing functions (e.g.,
transactional logging).
6 Comparison with Other Efforts
The reader is reminded of our litmus test for evaluating the overall success of a security
architecture:
It must be possible to protect, with a strong degree of confidence, critical
enterprise data and the servers manipulating that data while continuing to offer
less-protected service to clients executing on less trusted, or untrusted platforms.
A system approach failing to meet the first criterion cannot be called secure in any
justifiable sense, while a system approach failing to meet the second criterion cannot be called
operationally useful in any justifiable sense.
6.1 Scout
Scout is an advanced communications-oriented operating system [27]. Many of its key
abstractions (paths, modules, caches) seem to map directly to DEPOT key abstractions (flows,
DEPOTs, queues). Are these two independently developed versions of the same abstract
framework? We find that they are not.
Scout focuses upon a very different problem domain. The common thread among its
expected applications is that they use embedded computers with relatively fixed programs
meeting real-time performance requirements. Scout makes radical use of these common
characteristics for many of its optimizations: optimal processing paths and configurations are
identified in advance and a customized configuration is then compiled. Scout generally
emphasizes optimizations at the lower layers of the network stack although the techniques are
applicable at higher layers as well.
In contrast, DEPOT focuses on applications that must retooled rapidly while large sections of
code continue to execute. Dynamic linking of extensions is a natural solution to this problem.
DEPOTs TP-orientation tends to focus on the higher layers of the network stack although
available throughout.
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Scout and DEPOT are rather complementary. The notion of using Scout techniques to
optimize a cooperating DISS slice is attractive: one could imagine the optimized instances and
Scout infrastructure being distributed and installed locally via DEPOT. We plan to investigate
such ideas.
6.2 Liquid Software
The Liquid Software effort is focused on facilitating a new paradigm for network computing
based upon the notion of highly mobile non-interpreted code [22]. Integral to the concept is the
development of a "gigabit compiler" that generates platform dependent code from incoming
platform independent, intermediate code at reception speeds. Although the compiler is a major
focus, significant effort is also being devoted to system-level issues (such as security and safety)
and how such a capability might be used. The target initial platform is Scout, discussed above.
DEPOT represents a less general version of "mobile code": DISS modules would either be
interpreted, or compiled before being loaded and linked to the application. Installing the "same"
DISS on different platforms would require a separate compilation for each platform and the
correct version sent to each target. A Liquid Software compiler on each target host offers an
instant solution to this problem and would be immediately useful.
Roundhouse has something to offer to the Liquid Software effort as well: a plausible solution
to some (not all) of the security issues they have identified: viz., externally enforced protection
domains on selected platforms, and a sound approach for dealing with heterogeneously protected
instances of cooperating program instances.
6.3 Cherubim
Cherubim, characterized by its researchers as "a mobile, agent-based security
architecture"[ 11][44], is a project examined in some detail here because the problem domain
being addressed is essentially the same as ours: OLTP and C41 systems. Moreover, the
perceptions expressed concerning the need for malleable, application-oriented security policies
in this domain correspond to ours. Listed research topics are:
Core Security Services. This may be characterized as a portable crypto-system
implementation that provides a Java interface so that portable programs written in Java can
gain access to cryptographically secure communications. A complete set of cryptographic
services - encryption, decryption, digital signature, and signature verification - is supported.
It seems fair to characterize the service as an object-oriented API that, through specialization,
permits access to underlying popular crypto-systems.
This effort does not compete with our research, which does not currently involve actual
use or implementation of a crypto system. Our protection model assumes (but does not
detail) the availability of cryptographic services. Our intent is simply to select and use
existing cryptographic technology as the DEPOT effort proceeds. Cherubim Core Security
Services may be an attractive candidate for use at that time.
Active Capability Based Authorizations. Traditional discretionary access controls
(DAC) are often based upon the idea of an Access Control Matrix: where a Boolean value
indicates whether or not a given user may access a given object. Cherubim is to replaces the
Boolean value with an executable script.
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This responds to a genuine need. However, the Cherubim team seems to be describing a
system in which application-level security is to be designed, implemented, and dynamically
modified by programmers. (Programmers like scripts, ordinary people don't.) This
corresponds to current OLTP practice. However, many managers responsible for information
security view current practice as a significant threat: they would rather place control of
application security in the hands of operations staff and system administrators. The DEPOT
framework, by radically de-coupling security design from application design, permits this.
The programming and design of the security DISS extensions can be performed by a smaller
and more trusted group of programmers, implementing controls to be used by operational
personnel. A system of cooperating DISS instances permits "single point of management"
operation of controls. Finally, operational personnel have complete control over which set of
available security DISS extensions are coupled to the application servers.
Reflective Security Architecture. This effort is focused on the area of increasing the
"programmability" of security features into applications. Modest in scope, the effort is
moving in the proper direction of trying to extricate security-critical from application-level
code. Efforts include extensions to the Interface Definition Language (IDL) needed to simply
specify services, customizable binding methods, and extensions of existing visualization
software to data flows (mistakenly called information flows).
While useful, these efforts are not comparable in scope to the truly dynamic binding of
policy to application offered by DEPOT. In order to use the binding constructs offered under
this topic, the application must still be disabled, re-linked (at some level of abstraction), and
restarted. It is progress to bind policy to application at static link time, instead of compilation
time. It is even more progress to bind it at and during run-time, as does DEPOT, permitting
dynamic policy reconfigurations on the fly. This capability is essential to support the needs
of continuously operational applications, such as C I.
Active Security Policy. This is an exploration of the range and usability of policies
expressible using the Active Capability Based security model. Although we disagree in
principle with when such policies should be bound to the application, DEPOT could easily
serve as an alternative framework for hosting the actual policies being explored.
Secure Typing System. This theoretical effort focuses on proving security properties
using object-oriented theories of types and is of general interest to the community as well as
being particularly applicable to Cherubim's other work. The DEPOT effort is not focused on
providing application-level policy content beyond that of the default security DISS, and
could therefore make only limited use of this work.
In summary, our general criticism of the Cherubim effort is that it relies strongly on the
imputed security characteristics of its underlying software base (Java and various network
protocols). Java has known problems containing running applets, and Cherubim necessarily
inherits them. DEPOT, running in a Java-only environment would be no worse (and no better).
However, DEPOT also runs in environments offering hardware-enforced protection, and offers
an explicit model of protection showing how heterogeneously hosted instances may safely inter-
operate. Cherubim offers no equivalent theoretical abstraction that addresses this difficult
problem.
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6.4 We compare with competitive alternatives.
Other efforts, [4][29][33][45], seem to fall into two camps:
1. First camp: since the framework will run everywhere, we must solve the protection problem
for the worst-case instances - those running on single-state machines. This leads inevitably to
the invention of some notion of a protection domain, which must somehow be created by
software alone - a known intractable problem. In principle, it is possible to create software-
mediated domains either by providing a 100% interpretive environment or (equivalently)
passing everything that runs through an unbypassable compiler and verifier (an approach
suggested by Liquid Software). Historically, the Department of Defense accreditation
community has not been willing to accept completely interpretive solutions for high C41
applications.
Even if one assumes success, what one. has achieved is the ability to support multiple
LPDs on one node: only the starting point for our Protection Model. The problem of how to
integrate nodes having protection domains of varying strengths remains. This problem does
not seem to be seriously addressed by any competing Java-like effort.
2. Provide security to the granularity of whole nodes (i.e., ignore the potential existence of
multiple LPDs in a node and grant or deny access to resources - e.g., a private network -
based on node authentication alone. The DVPN project [33] uses this approach. It is common
because most existing protocols (e.g., IP) do not provide a means to name or address LPDs
within a node: such a capability must be added if a security infrastructure is to successfully
cope with heterogeneous platforms. It is not unsound to base network security on node
authentication alone, but wasteful and impractical: commanders do not want multiple
workstations on one desk.
7 Summary
The Roundhouse security architecture incorporates
"* A sound, conservative access control model for protection of distributed resources
"* Prevents critical resources from migrating to weakly protected domains or hosts
"* Prevents critical resources from being contaminated or modified from weakly protected
domains or hosts
"* Permits strongly protected servers to service not only clients having the same trust
characteristics, but less trusted clients as well.
"* Completes authentication architectures by specifying protection grades for key distribution
and storage functions.
"* Provides a framework for dynamically replaceable application-level security that allows the
creation of policy-neutral applications that are later dynamically linked to customizable
modules defining policies to be enforced.
We believe that this approach is consistent and sound, because it can be mapped to accepted
abstract models of ring-like protection systems [38]. In our interpretation of the model for
distributed protection, the operations of comparing and/or generating protection labels turns out
to include the functions of selecting and using indicated authentication and encryption protocols
using protection-related root keys for host identification and authentication. The process of
distributing root keys is part of the process for achieving a protected initial state: the binding of a
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given host public key to a protection class is part of the process of specifying the administrative
policy.
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